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278 THE JOVENAL OF PHILOSOPHY
from the literary side, these " Studies " are of great interest and im-
portance.
I. WoODBRIDGE RlLEY.
Vassab College.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. February, 1909. Les deux erreurs de la
metaphysique (113-141) : J. de Gaultier. - The two errors of metaphysics
are (1) assuming itself to have practical value as a science of the good in-
stead of remaining purely speculative, and (2) attributing objective being
to time, space, and matter. Examen critique des systemes classiques sur
les origines de la pensee religieuse (2 e et dernier article pp. 142-162) : E.
Durkheim. - As neither Naturalism nor Animism is adequate to explain
the origin of religion, this must be sought in a more fundamental and
primitive cult. De la connection des idees (pp. 163-179) : E. Tassy. - An
application of the author's " ideative erethism " to complete the present
inadequate theories of the association of ideas. F. Pillon, L'Annee phi-
losophique (1907) : J. Delvaille. In Honour of W. James, Essays Phi-
losophical and Psychological: A. Penjon. Morselli, Introduzione alia
filosofia moderna: J. Peres. R. Manzoni, Essais de philosophie positive
(trad, franc.) : F. Paulhan. F. Thomas, L 'education dans la famille: les
peches des parents: G. Compayre. E. Mach, La connaissance et Verreur:
A. Lalande. L. Robin, La theorie platonicienne des idees et des nombres
d'apres Aristote: C. Hoit. R. Picard, La philosophie sociale de Renou-
vier: G. L. Duprat. Kinkel, Oeschichte der Philosophie als Einleitung :
C. Huit. Gilbert, Die meteorologischen Theorien der Griechischen Al-
terthums: C. Huit. J. Adam, The Religious Teachers of Greece: C.
Huit. Kant, Gesammelte Schriften: J. Segond. Revue des periodiques
Strangers.
Cramanssel, E. " Le Premier eveil intellectuel de V enfant." Paris:
Felix Alcan. 1909. Pp. 192.
Croee, Benedetto. "Filosofia delta practica." Bari: Gius, Laterza, e
Figli. 1909. xix + 415.
Enrignes, Frederic. "Les problems de la science et de la logique."
Paris : Felix Alcan. 1909. Pp. 256. 3 fr. $0.75.
Joussain, A. " Le fondement psychologique de la morale." Paris : Felix
Alcan. 1909. Pp. viii -}- 144.
Kronenberg, M. " Geschichte des deutschen Idealismus." Erster Band:
die idealistische Ideen-Entwicklung von ihren Aufangen bis Kant.
Munich: Oscar Beck. 1909. Pp. xii+428. M. 11.
Maticvic, Von S. " Zur Grundlegung die Logik." Wien und Leipzig:
Wilhelm Braumiiller. 1909. Pp. 192.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 279
Offner, Max. "Das Gedachtniss. Die Ergebnisse der experimentellen
Psychologie und ihrer Anwendung in Unterricht und Erziehung."
Berlin: Reuter und Keichard. 1909. Pp. vi+275. M. 4.50.
Perrier, Joseph Louis. "The Revival of Scholastic Philosophy in the
Nineteenth Century." New York : The Columbia University Press.
1909. Pp. viii + 344.
Prezzolini, Guiseppe. "Benedetto Croce." Napoli: Riccardo Riccardi.
1909. Pp. 118.
Urban, Wilbur Marshall. " Valuation: Its Nature and its Laws — Being
an Introduction to the General Theory of Value." London: Swan
Sonnenschein & Co. New York. The Macmillan Co. 1909. Pp.
xviii+433. $2.75.
NOTES AND NEWS
The following abstract of the paper read by Dr. Hubert Foston on
" The Mutual Symbolism of Intelligence and Activity " before the Aris-
totelian Society on April 5, is from the Athenceum: "Intelligence and
activity are not so much names of two different facts as indications of two
ultimately distinct points of view for considering fact. Intelligence im-
plies procedure by way of definition; but definition can never be com-
pletely closed, because experience is continually subject to change. This
subjection to change is, from an active point of view, the key to oppor-
tunity; it involves a plasticity in fact which leaves room for hope and
effort. All definiteness in experience involves the intellectual point of
view; all consciousness of process involves an active basis-continu-
ous process being recognized only through active expectation. As
neither complete definiteness free from change, nor pure change or move-
ment without form, affords a possible start for interpreting experience,
we can not avoid in philosophy a double point of view, at once intellectual
and active. This double point of view can not actually be reduced to
theoretical unity, since there is really no comparison possible between
intelligence and activity, as if they were two kinds of fact. Neither is
there any contradiction between them — for contradiction can only be
asserted where two matters conflict when seen from a unitary point of
view. Since, however, intellect and activity are always mutually implied,
reference to the one comes ambiguously to symbolize a reference to
the other; and there thus arises the philosophical illusion of a unitary
point of view. While intelligence and activity can never fall for us into
a unity of comprehension, they do fall into a unity of conspiracy —
conspiring to suggest an ideal aim. All that can be known by beings
such as ourselves suggests an ideal, either of amelioration or of continu-
ance. But the suggestion of an ideal is not a matter of pure intelligence.
We can entertain it as such only because we are active beings. Our
activity must be taken seriously. The intellectualist analysis of it by
reference to the expansion of an idea against limits, owes its apparent
success to our being stirred to be sympathetically active in the very inter-